Minsky (1992) classifies borrowers by whether their cash flows can service their debt: hedge finance covers interest and principal, speculative finance only the interest, and Ponzi finance not even the interest, so that repayment depends on a rising asset price. A long period of stability shifts the weight of borrowers towards speculative and Ponzi finance. Kindleberger & Aliber (2005) describe the same dynamics as a sequence: displacement, boom, euphoria, distress and panic. The tulip mania, the South Sea and Mississippi bubbles of 1720 and the crash of 1929 show, however, why a bubble is hard to call: to call a price a bubble we need a model of fundamental value, and the test must work on a single time series, in real time, before the panic.
Explosiveness tests answer the second requirement. On the S&P (Standard & Poor's) Composite price-dividend ratio, monthly from 1871 to 2026, the GSADF (Generalised Sup Augmented Dickey–Fuller) statistic of Phillips, Shi & Yu (2015a) is 3.41, against a 95% critical value of 2.39, while the full-sample ADF (Augmented Dickey–Fuller) test, at −1.11, sees nothing. Date-stamping finds the episodes Nov 1928–Sep 1929 and May 1997–Aug 2001. The dot-com peak of the ratio is 90.2, in Aug 2000, against a long-run mean of 29.8, but the sample maximum, 91.2 in May 2026, falls in no episode: a high ratio is not necessarily explosive.
The second question is whether a sharp run-up announces a crash. In the industry data of Greenwood, Shleifer & You (2019), replicated in the course, a run-up above 100% was followed by a 40% crash in 45% of cases, with a 95% confidence interval (CI) of [27%, 62%], against 11% for a random industry-month. The mean return over the next two years, however, is not significantly different from zero, so run-ups raise the risk of a crash, not the predictable loss. The credit that finances the boom, Minsky's mechanism, appears in the study of Greenwood, Hanson, Shleifer & Sørensen (2022): in the course replication, after rapid growth of credit and asset prices (the R-zone), a household-sector crisis begins within three years in 34% of cases, against 4% in normal periods, based on only 25 crises.
The Further Topics and the Appendix are reading for familiarity.